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We  investigate  how  moral  concerns  about  permit  trading  affect  an  endogenous 
pollution permit trading equilibrium, where governments choose non-cooperatively 
the  amount  of  permits  they  allocate  to  domestic  industries.  Politicians  may  feel 
reluctant to allow permit trading and/or may prefer that abatement is undertaken 
domestically due to moral concerns. This will have an effect on the initial permit 
allocations,  and,  therefore,  on  global  emissions.  The  impact  on  global  emissions 
depends  on  the  precise  formulation  of  the  moral  concerns,  but  under  reasonable 
assumptions,  we  show  that  global  emissions  may  increase.  Thus,  doing  what  is 
perceived as good does not always yield the desired outcome. However, this can be 
offset by restrictions on permit trading when governments have moral concerns about 
this trade. 
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1. Introduction 
Economists typically prefer trade in pollution permits to conventional, non market-
based environmental policy instruments, as both in theory (Montgomery, 1972) and in 
practice  (Schmalensee  et  al.,  1998),  market-based  policy  instruments  have  been 
shown  to  foster  cost  effectiveness.  However,  many  non-economists  such  as 
environmental organisations and political parties have objected against permit trade. 
Some consider it a way of avoiding one’s obligations, to pay others to clean up, or to 
pay indulgence, see Goodin (1994).
1 
Several existing multinational tradable permit schemes contain restrictions on permit 
trading.  These  may  have  been  introduced  as  a  consequence  of  signatories  being 
reluctant to allow full trading.
2 In the Kyoto protocol on greenhouse gas emissions for 
instance, trade in pollution permits is allowed, but only as a supplement to national 
mitigation.
3 Also in the European Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), access to buying 
emission reductions in third party countries (JI – Joint Implementation for economies 
in transition and CDM - Clean Development Mechanism for developing countries) is 
limited.
4 Thus, the cost-effective volume of trade may not be within reach. 
In this paper we will study the implications of moral considerations about permit 
trading  in  an  international  cap-and-trade  market.  These  moral  considerations  are 
assumed to play a role only in the governments’ decision making process; not in the 
profit maximization objective of the permit trading firms. In a first stage of the model, 
governments are assumed to negotiate on national emission targets at an international 
forum. The emission ceilings are allocated freely to the national industries, which can 
trade the permits in an international and competitive pollution permit market in the 
second stage of the model. The set up is similar to the one of Helm (2003) and implies 
that  the  overall  emissions,  and  hence  the  total  number  of  pollution  permits,  is 
                                                
1 Carsten Helm pointed out to us that "Luftverschmutzungsrechte" - tradable air pollution permits - was 
on place 3 in the 2004 voting for the "Unwort des Jahres" (ugliest word of the year) in Germany, see 
http://www.unwortdesjahres.org/. 
2 Competing explanations based on market power arguments have also been put forward, see Ellerman 
and Wing (2000). 
3 Article 6.1 of the original Kyoto Protocol text states “The acquisition of emission reduction units shall 
be  supplemental  to  domestic  actions  for  the  purposes  of  meeting  commitments  under  Article  3”. 
However, later meetings of the Conference of the Parties (CoP) have not been able to find a consensus 
on a more precise or quantitative meaning of this supplementarity requirement. 
4 More details on the latest proposed changes in the EU ETS 3
rd phase (2013-2020) can be found at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/796. As by May 2009, it is clear 
that access to CDM and JI projects will not be unlimited.    3 
determined endogenously and not given exogenously as is the case in most of the 
existing  literature  on  tradable  permit  markets. Our  model  is  particularly  suited  to 
describe the ongoing negotiation process to forge a follow up agreement to the Kyoto 
Protocol, which should culminate in a new climate treaty by the end of 2009. Most 
likely, a new agreement will combine national emissions targets with provisions for 
emissions trading. 
Moral considerations are captured in our model by means of identity effects (Akerlof 
and Kranton, 2000, 2005; Brekke, et al., 2003). Governments are assumed to care 
about the identity of their nation as this reflects the views of their voters. There may 
be different reasons for moral concerns as discussed below, and we focus on two 
ways to specify identity effects, that we think capture many arguments that have been 
raised. First, we assume that a nation’s identity is negatively affected by its net permit 
trade volume. This reflects the idea that some do not like trading pollution permits 
simply because they believe one should not trade in an essentially non-desirable item 
like licences to pollute. But, at the same time, we assume that countries are willing to 
trade off the better identity against benefits from exchanging permits.  
In our second formulation of moral considerations, we assume countries’ identities 
depend on their actual abatement effort at home. Thus, they benefit in identity terms 
from  abating  at  home  instead  of  buying  emission  reductions  elsewhere.  This  is 
specified as the identity depending negatively on the gap between countries’ actual 
and ideal emission levels, the latter reflecting what they think they ideally should do. 
This formulation captures concern for the state of the global environment and one’s 
own responsibility for it. 
We study how moral considerations may affect global emissions in an endogenous 
permit trading equilibrium, and we find that the effect on global emissions depends on 
how  these  concerns  are  specified.  With  distaste  for  permit  trading,  moral 
considerations will most likely lead to higher, instead of lower, global emissions in an 
international climate agreement with permit trading. The reason is that on average, 
permit importing countries have a stronger incentive to over allocate their domestic 
industries to reduce permit purchases compared to the incentive of permit exporting 
countries to under allocate theirs. However, if the concern of countries is based on a 
preference for domestic abatement and global responsibility, global emissions will go 
down.  This  conclusion  is  based  on  an  equal  concern  in  all  countries,  which  will   4 
probably not  be the case.  If only  a few countries share  this concern, the positive 
environmental  effect  may  be  rather  small.  Both  these  results  show  that  good 
intentions do not always yield the desired results. 
While restrictions on permit trading as introduced in the Kyoto Protocol and the ETS, 
may be bad for the environment as they increases the costs of reaching an emissions 
target, and, therefore, the incentive to join a treaty, we show that such restrictions may 
actually  reduce  global  emissions  when  governments  are  morally  concerned  about 
trading permits. The reason is that the incentive of permit importers to over allocate 
domestic  industries  to  reduce  permit  purchase  has  been  reduced.  Thus,  if  the 
restrictions  result  from  reluctance  to  trade,  they  may  actually  be  good  for  the 
environment. 
The paper is organised in the following way. We first discuss possible reasons behind 
the reluctance to trade pollution permits. In section 3, we present the model, while 
section 4 derives conclusions on how moral concerns about emission permit trading 
change governments’ behaviour in the permit trading market and, therefore, global 
emissions.  Section 5  studies  the  impacts  on  global  emissions  from  restrictions  on 
buying permits, and the final section concludes. 
2. Ethical reasoning, norms and identity 
In economic theory, it is assumed that most goods can be bought or sold in a market. 
However,  this  may  not  always  be  the  case  and  distaste,  or  even  repugnance,  for 
certain transactions may be a real constraint in many markets, see Roth (2007) for a 
survey.
5  This  situation  can  be  described  as  if  there  exists  a  norm  against  trading 
certain goods. A norm is defined as a standard of right or wrong, and in all cultures 
there are goods that are considered to be “priceless” or “sacred” in such a way that we 
cannot set a price on them. Examples may be life, freedom, love, friendship, children, 
religion, democracy and the environment. Some of these goods are called taboo goods 
(Fiske and Tetlock, 1997) where a taboo is defined as a particularly powerful kind of 
normative prohibition. Taboos are meant to protect individuals and societies “from 
behaviour defined or perceived to be dangerous” (Tannenwald, 1999), and breaking a 
taboo usually results in social sanctions or repercussions. However, there are also 
                                                
5 Frank (1985), chapter 10, also gives several examples of why trade in certain goods should not be 
allowed.   5 
tradable goods for which there is a social norm against it being freely traded, but for 
which  this  norm  is  not  as  strict  as  for  taboo  goods.  Examples  may  be  legalized 
prostitution, body organs and military duty (Bénabou and Tirole, 2007; Roth, 2007). 
Some kinds of transactions are considered repugnant in some times and places, but 
not in others, thus the boundaries between the secular and the sacred are evolving 
over time. Slavery used to exist in large parts of the world, but is now repugnant and 
illegal in most places. But there have also been more positive attitudes to some goods 
over time such as life insurance (Zeliner, 1999) and legalized prostitution. 
Markets for pollution permits has been recognised by several authors as a case in 
which there may exist some reluctance or even repugnance against transactions, see, 
e.g., Goodin (1994), Bénabou and Tirole (2007) and Roth (2007). But why may there 
be  reluctance against  trade in  pollution permits? We can identify  several possible 
reasons for this, some of which are based on arguments rooted in a more procedural 
view of justice, and others in a more consequentialist ethics framework. 
Based on a procedural justice approach, on can argue that industrialised countries 
have  created  the  global  warming  problem,  and  that  it  is  their  duty  to  reduce  the 
consequences of it, even if this does not minimise overall costs of taking action. This 
can  be  used  as  an  argument  against  developing  countries  selling  permits  to 
industrialised countries because the permit trade would not lead to abatement in the 
countries  responsible  for  the  problem.  Another  argument  is  based  on  unfair 
background conditions (see Kverndokk, 1995, and Eyckmans and Schokkaert, 2004). 
Even if two parties agree to trade permits, the trade may not be justified on ethical 
grounds. A voluntary agreement between two parties is not necessary fair if is entered 
into conditions that are not fair (Pogge, 1989). Background justice is not preserved 
when some participant’s basic rights, opportunities or economic positions are grossly 
inferior.
6 Under the Kyoto Protocol, for instance, some may argue that this is the case 
for some CDM contracts, as this is a trade between poor and rich countries.
7 
Another  line  of  arguments  hinges  on  consequentialist  ethics.  Standard  economic 
analysis is basically about consequences and if the consequences of a particular policy 
are positive (i.e., increased welfare), economists recommend it. This is the case with 
                                                
6 Some examples can be kidney trade or an agreement between a prostitute and her/his customer. 
7 Some argue that it is not fair that the developed countries take all the “low hanging fruits” and the 
developing countries are left with the more expensive mitigation options in a possible future 
agreement.   6 
emission permits.  The  basic  argument in favour  of permit  trade is that  it  is cost-
effective  (Montgomery,  1972).  Parties  involved  in  permit  trade  would  get  lower 
abatement costs than if they had to mitigate the emissions within their geographical 
boundaries. Thus, cost-savings will be welfare improving, everything else equal. One 
possible  explanation  of  the  resistance  to  permit  trade  is,  therefore,  that  welfare 
improvements following from permit trade have not been communicated well enough, 
i.e., this point of view is based on lack of information.
8  
However, explanations based on allegedly negative consequences of a permit market, 
may also be plausible. Buying CDM quotas, i.e., greenhouse gasses pollution permits 
in countries that did not subscribe to binding emission limits in the Kyoto Protocol, 
may have adverse effects based on lack of an emission baseline, moral hazard, lack of 
incentives to undertake emissions reductions by the developing countries, transaction 
costs and carbon leakages. As a result, CDM projects may not fully offset emissions, 
see Rosendahl and Strand (2009). Hot air, meaning that some countries receive an 
initial emission quota allocation that exceeds their actual emissions, has also been 
mentioned as a reason to avoid emission trading as trading hot air will not reduce 
emissions. 
Abating at home instead of buying emission permits may also be seen as a better 
policy based on consequences. Arguments that have been raised in this debate are the 
positive spillover effects of technology development by national abatement as well as 
the ancillary benefits (reduction in local emissions, traffic accidents, congestion etc.) 
of abating at home.  It is further argued that unilateral abatement may lead to similar 
behaviour by other countries, it may affect positively the negotiation climate in the 
international policy arena, and it may reduce the conflict of interest within a country 
as it actually shows the true costs of abatement, a cost that economic agents have an 
incentive to exaggerate; see Hoel (1991) and Golombek and Hoel (2004). 
Also  environmental  justice,  related  to  race  and  ethnicity,  has  been  used  as  an 
argument for abating at home related to the ancillary benefits argument above (see, 
e.g., Kverndokk and Rose, 2008, for a survey). Many toxic waste sites are located in 
or near minority neighborhoods, and this has led to opposition to emissions trading. 
                                                
8  One  example pointed  out to  us by  Alistair  Ulph  is  as  follows.  If a  country  has  extremely  high 
marginal abatement costs (in the limit infinite: i.e., it cannot abate) then wanting to do all the abatement 
at home is just not sensible; it would seem more appropriate, for a country to use its resources to pay a 
country which can abate cheaply to do so.   7 
Although the location of greenhouse gas reduction does not matter because it is a 
globally mixed pollutant, reduction of co-pollutants (e.g., sulfur oxides, particulates, 
air toxics) does. Minority neighborhoods might not gain a potential reduction of these 
co-pollutants if the local emitters buy permits and, therefore, do not take actions to 
lower emissions of all pollutants at home. 
The  discussion  above  provides  arguments,  based  on  both  procedural  fairness  and 
consequentialist  ethics,  against  permit  trading.  We  summarize  this  discussion  by 
reducing it to two basic statements that we will use to formalize moral concerns: 
1) People might dislike permit trading, and 
2) People might prefer to do abatement at home. 
The first statement is weaker than the second as reluctance to trade permits does not 
necessary mean that countries care about the environment. However, reasons to avoid 
trading are often based on a preference for environmental values, and in the second 
claim, the major motivation is to save the environment, independent of international 
agreements and quota trade. We do not claim that these statements are true or that 
there are good ethical arguments against permit trading. Instead, we take an agnostic 
stand  and  take  these  arguments  as  given  as  we  think  they  describe  some  of  the 
reluctance observed in the political debate on permit trading. Also note that in the 
following, we assume that governments perform the moral reasoning on behalf of 
their  voters,  so  that  moral  concerns  by  the  people  of  a  nation  are  reflected  in 
government’s  policies.  If  a  substantial  share  of  voters  has  moral  concerns  about 
permit trading, it will be reflected in the government’s decision if politicians care 
about their re-election chances. 
The statements above may constitute a norm against trading pollution permits. Norms 
are closely related to the preservation of identity, and by modelling a norm against 
permit trade, we build on the theory of identity and moral motivation (Akerlof and 
Kranton,  2000,  2005;  Brekke,  et  al.,  2003).  In  this  way  we  can  model  both  the 
reluctance to trade with pollution permits, and given that the agent does not follow the 
norm, the wish to reduce the trade even if it is economically profitable. As the reasons 
for  reluctance  to  trade  may  be  based  on  both  procedural  fairness  as  well  as 
consequences, we do not try to endogenise the norm in the model, meaning that we do 
not determine why a society chooses a certain norm against pollution permit trading.   8 
3.  The endogenous permit market allocation model 
Our  framework  is  based  on  Helm  (2003)  who  presents  a  model  of  international 
emissions trading in which countries choose the amount of permits they allocate to 
their  domestic  industry  in  an  endogenous  and  non-cooperative  way.
9  We  expand 
Helm’s model by introducing moral concerns (identity considerations). Countries are 
assumed to be reluctant to trade emissions permits and/or may dislike the fact that 
they emit more than what they think they ideally should do. 
The  basic  building  blocks  of  the  model  are  as  follows.  There  are  n  countries  or 
governments engaged in negotiating a future international environmental agreement 
including provisions for pollution permit trading. The governments represent the view 
of their voters who are, to some extent, reluctant to trade permits. However, they are 
also willing to trade if the benefits from trade are large enough. As in Helm (2003), 
we  make  the  assumption  that  the  permit-trading  regime  is  established  only  by 
unanimous approval of all countries.
10 
In  the  first  stage,  governments  choose  non-cooperatively  their  initial  emissions 
allocation.  This  set-up  resembles  closely  the  reality  of  international  climate 
negotiations,  in  particular  in  the  run  up  to  the  1997  Kyoto  Protocol  and  in  the 
negotiations  on  a  follow  up  agreement.  Another  example  is  the  ETS  where  EU 
member states had to draft National Allocation Plans (NAPs) suggesting a permit 
allocation  for  all  installation  covered  by  the  ETS  directive  on  their  territory  for 
Phase 1 (2005-2007) and Phase 2 (2008-2012). In contrast to most of the literature on 
national emission permit schemes, the overall number of permits cannot be assumed 
to be exogenous in an international context. 
In the second stage of the game, individual firms trade emissions in a competitive 
permit market. We assume that they obey the emission ceiling and that they maximize 
their private profit only. Thus, firms do not have moral concerns about trading.
11 
This game is solved by backward induction, i.e., we start be solving the second stage. 
                                                
9 For other applications of the model, see Holtsmark and Sommervoll (2008) and Carbone et al. (2009). 
10 Allowing for endogenous coalition formation would substantially complicate the analysis, as the 
countries  are  not  symmetric  in  our  analysis.  Symmetric  or  homogeneous  countries  is  a  common 
assumption in studies of coalition formation, see, e.g., Barrett (2005), but would be inappropriate in our 
case since the difference between countries is essential in the analysis of pollution permit trading. 
11 This is consistent with Siebert (1992, p. 130) and Rauscher (2006) who argue that a firm spending 
resources on social activities not rewarded by the market will not remain competitive and will be 
driven out of the market. However, if firms have market power, non-profit motives can survive.   9 
3.1 Stage 2: Firms trading emissions 
In every country  1 2 ∈ = … i N { , , ,n} there is a large number of identical firms that 
maximizes profits due to emissions, π, taking as given the emissions trading scheme: 
  ( ) ( ) [ ] max ; ,
i
i i i i i i i e e p B e p e π ω ω = + −   (1) 
Let  0 i ω ≥  be the initial allocation of permits to the representative firm in country i 
and assume that permits are allocated for free. For simplicity, we set the emissions of 
one country equal to the emissions of its representative firm,  [ ] 0, i i e e ∈ , where  i e  is 
business  as  usual  (BAU)  emissions,  i.e.,  emissions  in  absence  of  an  international 
treaty and any moral considerations. This is the maximum emissions that a country 
will  emit.
12  Emissions  can  be  traded  at  a  given  market  price  p .  Firms  choose 
emissions in order to maximize profits, i.e., the sum of benefits and net permit trade 
revenues. The benefits of emissions,  i B , can be interpreted as a production function. 
Production requires input of carbon emissions, and is assumed increasing and strictly 
concave in emissions:  0 ≥
e
i B  and  0
ee
i B < . In the Appendix, the formal properties of 
the benefit function are derived from the standard properties of an emission abatement 
cost function. 
From the first-order condition for profit maximization, we can derive the demand for 
emissions:
  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 e e
i i i i i B e p e E p B p
−
= ⇒ = =   (2) 
Profit maximizing behaviour by firms leads to cost-effectiveness; marginal benefits of 
emissions are equalised across firms. Thus, this condition is valid even if countries 
have moral arguments against permit trading as such considerations are not taken into 
account by the competitive firms. 
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i
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∂
  (3) 
                                                
12 Note that will moral concerns on abatement at home, emissions will be less than  i e  even in the 
absence of a climate treaty, see section 4.4.   10 
Using first-order condition (2), we can define a “net supply of permits” function that 
is increasing in the price of permits: 
  ( ) ( ) with 0
p p i
i i i i i
S




= − = = − >
∂
  (4) 
A permit market equilibrium defines a price level such that total net supply of permits 
is nonnegative: 
  ( ) ( ) such that 0
o o o
j j j
j N j N
p S p E p ω
∈ ∈
  = − ≥   ∑ ∑   (5) 
This  market  equilibrium  condition  implicitly  defines  a  price  function  mapping  a 
vector of emission allocations ω into the market clearing price level:  ( )
o p ρ = ω . We 
assume that the marginal benefit functions are such that for every vector of emission 
allocations, there exists a unique equilibrium permit price.
13 The permit price function 
can be shown to be decreasing in the initial allocations of permits to a country. 














= = = <
∂ ∑
ω   (6) 
Hence, in accordance with standard economic intuition, higher allocations of permits 
lead to a decrease in the equilibrium permit price. 
3.2 Stage 1: Governments choosing initial permit allocations 
Given the smoothly working permit market in stage two, governments negotiate in 
stage one on the initial allocation of permits, and we assume that they choose the 
number of permits  i ω  as to maximize the following national welfare function: 
  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) , ; , ,
S
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i W e B e p e D I e e ω ω ω ω ω ω − − = + − − + +   (7) 
The function  i D  denotes pollution damages incurred in country i. These damages are 
convex  in  global  emissions,  defined  by  the  total  amount  of  permits  distributed 
(country i’s permits are  i ω , while all other countries’ emission permits are denoted by 
i ω− ). Thus, the environmental problem is caused by a uniformly mixing pollutant as 
                                                
13  If  more  permits  would  be  allocated  than  the  net  demand  for  emissions,  we  assume  that  the 
equilibrium price is zero:  ( ) 0 0
o
j j
j N j N
E p ω
∈ ∈
> ⇒ = ∑ ∑ .   11 
in the case of global warming. We assume that country i maximizes its welfare, taking 
as  given  the  permit  allocations  by  all  other  countries  ( i i ω ω − − = ).  Hence,  we  are 
looking for a Nash equilibrium in permit allocations among national governments.  
Our set-up is similar to the model introduced by Helm (2003). However, in addition to 
the approach by Helm, we assume that countries have moral concerns about permit 
trading  defined as  an  identity,  Ii,  which  adds positively  to  their  welfare  function. 
Identity is usually defined as a person’s self image – as an individual or as a part of a 
group (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). Identity has been recognised as important for 
individual  behaviour  in  fields  as  social  psychology  and  sociology,  but  has  only 
recently been adopted in formal economic models. In this paper we define a country’s 
moral  concerns  in  the  same  way  as  the  identity  of  an  individual  as  governments 
perform the moral reasoning on behalf of their voters.  
The model also bears some resemblance to the literature on voluntary provision of 
public goods, see Bergstrom et al. (1986), and in particular to the strand of literature 
on  the  so-called  “warm  glow  of  giving”,  see  Andreoni  (1990).  In  this  literature, 
economic agents care about the overall level of the public good and feel good about 
contributing a positive amount to its provision. One can interpret this warm glow 
effect as a positive identity effect (see Brekke et al., 2003). However, in our model, 
private  contributions,  in  the  sense  of  low  allocation  of  pollution  permits  to  one’s 
domestic industry, may lead to a cold feeling instead of a warm glow as this increases 
the incentives for firms to enter the permit trading market and buy large amounts of 
permits. 
Based on the statements made in section 2, the moral concern (identity) of a country is 
a function of it’s actual emissions,  i e , it’s permit allowances ωi as well as it’s ideal 
emissions, 
S
i e . The latter is defined as the emission level that the country would like 
to aim for based on ethical reasoning. This ideal is considered exogenous. We return 
to this in section 4. 
Using the notation introduced before, we can write the welfare function of country i, 
taking into account the competitive permit trading in stage two, as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,
, ,
i i i i i i i
S
i i i i i i i
W B E E
D I E e
ω ω ρ ρ ω ρ
ω ω ρ ω
−
−




  (8)   12 
Each country wants to set its initial permit allocation,  ωi, in order to maximize its 
welfare  defined  by  expression (8),  where  the  strategy  space  for  every  player  is 
[ ] 0, ∈ i i e ω . The first-order condition for an interior solution is, therefore,
14 where ∆ i I  
is the change in identity for a change in ωi: 
  [ ] 1 0   + − + − − +∆ =  
e p p
i i i i i i i B E E E D I
ω ω ω ω ρ ρ ω ρ ρ   (9) 
Using the first-order condition 
e
i B ρ =  of competitive permit trading among firms in 
stage 2 (eq. (2)), the following condition should be satisfied for all countries  ∈ i N : 
  [ ] 0 − + − +∆ = i i i i E D I
ω ω ρ ω ρ   (10) 
The first term on the left hand side (LHS) is the effect of additional permit allocations 
on  the  emission  trading  revenue  through  the  effect  on  the  permit  price.  A  more 
generous permit allocation is beneficial for permit importers (the market price goes 
down), while a more restricted permit allocation is beneficial for permit exporters (the 
market price goes up). We label this effect the strategic permit trading effect. 
The second term is the direct price effect of a more generous permit allocation. Every 
additional permit is worth the prevailing market price ρ . The third term stands for the 
additional pollution damage effect caused by a more generous permit allocation. More 
permits lead, ceteris paribus, to higher global emissions and hence higher pollution 
damages. This effect is therefore negative. Finally, the last term captures the change 
in  the  moral  concerns  of  extra  permits.  This  effect  can  be  positive  or  negative 
depending on the precise specification of the identity function. 
Rearranging (10) and using again the firms’ profit maximizing first-order condition 
e
i B ρ = , we obtain: 
  [ ] = − − −∆
e
i i i i i B D E I
ω ω ρ ω   (11) 
Hence,  every  country  chooses  an  initial  permit  allocation  such  that  its  marginal 
benefit from the last ton of emissions equals individual marginal damages, corrected 
for a strategic permit trade effect and an identity effect. 
                                                
14  All variables and functions are evaluated in the Nash equilibrium of permit allocations, i.e., the 
permit allocations of other countries are taken as exogenous.   13 
4.  Different formulations of nations’ moral concerns 
4.1 Reluctance to trade 
So far we have not specified the identity function. Let us consider the two statements 
on  moral  concerns  from  section 2:  Countries  might  dislike  permit  trading,  and 
countries  might  prefer  to  do  all  the  abatement  at  home.  However,  for  ease  of 
exposition, we study the two statements separately before combining them. 
We  first  focus  on  the  statement  that  countries  dislike  permit  trading.  Assume  a 
symmetric formulation of reluctance to trade, i.e., countries dislike both selling and 
buying permits: 




   − − − ≠    = 
 
i i i i i
i i i
F E if E
I e
otherwise
δ ω ρ ω ρ
ω
ω ω
  (12) 
Involvement in permit trading represents a cost, both for buyers and sellers, due to the 
fact that one does not act in accordance with one’s moral conviction. This loss in 
identity consists of a fixed cost independent of the amount of permits traded, and a 
variable cost. The fixed cost,  0 i F > , is the loss of going from one regime to another, 
here represented by going from a non-trade regime to a trading regime. However, the 
volume of trade also matters. If a country decides to trade, it feels less comfortable the 
higher  the  volume  of  permit  trading  is  when  0 δ > .
15  An  example  can  be  the 
supplementary condition in the Kyoto Protocol as well as recent political discussions 
in Norway on setting a limit on how much one can reduce abatement abroad. Finally, 
note that this identity function has a maximum at zero without emissions trading. 
The specification of the moral concerns, both the fixed and the variable term represent 
costs of trading and thus lower welfare in the trading system compared to when moral 
concerns are not present. This shares similarities with a permit trade system with 
transaction costs as in Stavins (1995). With transaction costs, the volume of trade is 
lower and welfare is lower compared to a system without such costs. Also the initial 
allocation  of  permits  may  affect  the  outcome  of  trading.  However,  moral 
considerations  affect  permit  trading  differently  than  transaction  costs  in  several 
                                                
15 In the case where 0 δ = , i.e., there is an identity cost of not following the norm, which is independent 
on the volume of trade as long as the volume is positive, we will actually get the same first order 
conditions as when identity does not matter, i.e.,  0 i I ∆ = .   14 
respects. First, the fixed identity term affects the decision whether the country wants 
to take part in the permit trading market, and second, the endogenous part of the 
identity function affects the allocation of initial allowances as countries do not want 
the allocations to be very different from actual emissions. However, for a given level 
of aggregated  allowances  (global  emissions  target),  the  outcome  of  trading  is  not 
affected by the initial allowance allocation. In our model, firms face no transaction 
costs in trade so they trade  cost-effectively, i.e.,  marginal  abatement costs  among 
sources are equal. This is not the case in models with transaction costs as these costs 
are usually modelled as a function of the volume of trade. 
Using this explicit identity function, we can derive the following lemma: 
LEMMA 1 
If countries are reluctant to trade permits, and if identity is symmetric, then: 
•  if country i is a permit seller ( i i E ω > ) it follows that 
e e
i i B D > ; 
•  if country i is a permit buyer ( i i E ω < ) it follows that 
e e
i i B D < . 
This means that sellers underallocate and buyers overallocate emissions compared to 
a situation without permit trading and without moral concerns. 
Proof:  The  change  in  identity  from  a  marginal  increase  in  i ω   is  given  by: 
[ ] 2 1
p
i i i i I E E
ω δ ρ ω   ∆ = − − −   . This change is positive for permit buyers and negative 








≤ = ≤ ∑ . It follows from (11) that: 
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ρ ω δ ρ ω
ω ρ δ ρ    
and therefore 
e e
i i B D ￿  if  i i E ω ￿ . 
Q.E.D. 
The lemma says that permit sellers allocate permits so that the marginal benefit from 
emissions is higher than the marginal damage, while it is the other way around for 
permit buyers. The intuition is as follows. Net permit selling countries tend to under 
allocate their domestic firms, yielding marginal benefit from emissions in excess of   15 
marginal costs, as this makes permits scarce and drives up the equilibrium market 
price. In addition, the under allocation has positive identity effects as the volume of 
trade goes down and the gap between permit allocation and actual emissions shrinks. 
On the other hand, net permit buying countries tend to over allocate their domestic 
firms because this makes permits more abundant and lowers the market price. Further, 
the same identity mechanism as described for sellers is also valid for buyers; over 
allocating permits has positive identity effects as the volume of trade goes down. 
Summarizing,  the  moral  concerns,  if  they  only  stem  from  reluctance  to  trade, 
strengthen the results obtained by Helm (2003). They reinforce the strategic trade 
incentives for both sellers and buyers of permits. This proves to be a useful result for 
the remainder of the paper. 
4.2 Asymmetric reluctance to trade 
How does the introduction of moral concerns affect the global amount of permits 
issued  into  the  market?  We  start  with  a  simple  case  based  on  the  fact  that  the 
discussion on the acceptability of permit trading is mainly a topic in countries that are 
potential permit buyers. This means that the identity function is asymmetric, where 
countries only suffer an identity loss if they buy permits:  
( )




i i i i i
i i i i i i
F E if E
I e F if E
otherwise
δ ω ρ ω ρ
ω β ω




            (13) 
 
PROPOSITION 1 
If  only  buyers  are  reluctant  to  trade  (asymmetric  identity  function),  then  every 
individual country will emit more and global emission  will be  higher than in  the 
endogenous permit allocation equilibrium without moral concerns. 
Proof: The first-order conditions for governments issuing permits are different for 
permit importers ( i i E ω < ) and exporters ( i i E ω ≥ ), see (11): 
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     16 
Summing over both types of countries and using the market clearing condition from 
(5), it follows that:  
  { } 2 min 0, 1 0
ω δ ω ρ
∈ ∈ ∈
  − − − − =   ∑ ∑ ∑
e e p
j j j j j
j N j N j N
B D E E    
Assuming,  in  contrast  to  the  claim  in  the  proposition, 
I o
N N ω ω <   and  using  the 
convexity  of  the  damage  functions,  it  follows  that:  ( ) ( )
e I e o
j N j N
j N j N
D D ω ω
∈ ∈
< ∑ ∑ . 
Summing over the appropriate first-order conditions for both equilibria, see (10), it 
can be shown that (recall that 0 1 1
p
j E
ω ρ   ≤ − ≤   ):  
  { }
2







ρ ρ ω ρ
∈
  − < − − <   ∑    
Hence, the equilibrium permit price would be lower with asymmetric moral concerns 
than without. Given that the equilibrium price function is decreasing in the global 
permit  allocation,  we  get 
I o
N N ω ω > ,  which  contradicts  the  initial  assumption. 
Therefore, 
I o
N N ω ω ≥ , and moral concerns will lead to higher global emissions than 
without such concerns. 
As we have shown that the equilibrium permit price will be lower with asymmetric 
moral  concerns  than  without,  every  country’s  representative  firm  will  emit  more: 
( ) ( )
e I I o e o I o
i i i i i i B E B E E E ρ ρ = < = ⇒ >  due to concavity of the benefit functions. 
Q.E.D. 
The proposition is intuitively clear. From Lemma 1 we know that permit buyers have 
an incentive to over allocate their domestic industries because of 1) strategic trade 
considerations (driving down the equilibrium permit price), and 2) moral concerns 
(over  allocating  domestic  firms  reduces  the  amount  of  permits  that  has  to  be 
imported).  Since  only  buyers’  moral  concerns  are  taken  into  account  in  the 
asymmetric identity function, global emissions in the international Nash equilibrium 
will be higher than in the scenario without such considerations.   17 
4.3 Symmetric reluctance to trade 
We now turn to the more complicated case where both permit importers and exporters 
dislike permit trading, i.e., the symmetric identity function. In order to find the global 
effect,  we  summarise  all  countries  first-order  conditions  based  on  (10)  and 
[ ] 2 1
p
i i i i I E E
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n D E E
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∈ ∈
  = − −   ∑ ∑   (14) 
As  the  following  result  shows,  the  outcome  depends  on  the  “balance  of  power” 
between permit exporters and importers.
16 
PROPOSITION 2 







  − > <   ∑ , global emissions will be lower (higher) and every country 
will emit less (more) than without moral concerns. 






  − >   ∑  and 
I o
N N ω ω > , where N ω  is 
global emissions and top script I and O refers to the equilibrium with moral concerns 
and  without  such  concerns  respectively.  Because  of  convexity  of  the  damage 
functions if follows that:  ( ) ( )
e I e o
j N j N
j N j N
D D ω ω
∈ ∈
> ∑ ∑ . Using (14) and the appropriate 
condition when there is no identity function (i.e., the second term of the right hand 
side of (14) is equal to zero), it is easily shown that: 
                                                
16 Note that in the following propositions we do not do comparisons to a first best social optimum as in 
general the first best solution with and without moral concerns would differ. One exception is the first 
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Hence, the equilibrium permit price with moral concerns would be higher than the 
price without such concerns. Given that the equilibrium price is decreasing in the 
global permit allocation, 
I o
N N ω ω < , which contradicts the initial assumption. 






  − >   ∑ , global emissions will be 
lower and, hence, the equilibrium price of permits will be higher in case of moral 
concerns  and,  therefore,  every  country’s  representative  firm  will  emit  less: 
( ) ( )
e I I o e o I o
i i i i i i B E B E E E ρ ρ = > = ⇒ <  due to concavity of the benefit functions. 
Q.E.D. 






  − >   ∑ , reluctance to trade leads to lower overall emission 
allocations, and hence lower emissions, than in the absence of moral considerations. 






  − >   ∑ ? It can be interpreted 
as  a  weighted  average  of  all  permit  trades,  where  permits  exporters  have 
0   − <  
p
j j j E E ω   and  importers 0   − >  
p
j j j E E ω ,  and  where  the  weights, 
p
j E ,  are 
given by the inverse of the slope of the marginal benefit of emissions function (recall 
that  1 0
p ee






  −   ∑   to  be  positive,  permit 
exporters  should,  on  average,  have  smaller  absolute  values  of 
p
i E   than  permit 
importers.  Note  that  high  absolute  values  of 
ee
i B   (i.e.,  steep  marginal  emission 
abatement cost functions) imply small absolute values of 
p
i E . Therefore, the term is 
positive if permit sellers are predominantly countries with steep marginal abatement 
cost functions (see the Appendix).  
This is not very likely in the Kyoto permit market. Most empirical models predict the 
contrary,  i.e.,  that low  abatement cost countries  (i.e.,  countries  with flat  marginal 
benefit functions, 
e
i B ) will export carbon emissions permits, see Böhringer (2002),   19 
Den Elzen and de Moor (2002) or Eyckmans and Hagem (2008). Therefore, it is more 
likely that moral concerns would lead to a higher number of permits issued. This 
means that the solution with moral concerns is likely to to result in higher global 
emissions than in the absence of those considerations. The result is again due to the 
over allocation of permits in permit importing countries that follows from Lemma 1. 
4.4 Preferences for abatement at home 
Reluctance to trade is one aspect of a country’s moral concerns, but the country could 
also have preferences for doing the abatement at home. To model this, we assume that 
identity depends on the relationship between actual emissions and the morally ideal 
emissions, 
S
i e , i.e., the amount of emissions the country thinks it ideally should aim 
for. This can be specified in the following way: 




i i i i i I e e e e γ   = − −     (15) 
As  the  countries  are  concerned  about  the  global  environment,  it  is  reasonable  to 
assume that the ideal requires substantial abatement. One way to specify this is to 
follow Brekke et al. (2003) and assume that countries share an ethical view that global 
social  welfare  should  be  maximized.  Thus,  “ideal”  emissions  are  found  by 
maximizing a utilitarian global welfare function where everybody follows the same 
general rule, namely to emit the amount that maximizes global welfare: 
  ( ) ( )
1 2
2
, , , max
n
S
j j j k j j e e e
j N k N
B e D e e e γ
∈ ∈
      − − −           ∑ ∑ …  
This gives rise to the following first-order conditions: 
  ( )
* * * 2
e S e
i i i i j k
j N k N
B e e e D e i N γ
∈ ∈
    − − = ∀ ∈       ∑ ∑  
We see that the global welfare function is maximized for 
S
i e = 
*
i e . Thus, in this case 
the identity terms disappears, and the first order conditions equal the well known 
Samuelson rule (see, e.g., Eyckmans et al., 1993) that defines the first-best allocation 
of emissions without moral concerns: 
  ( )
* * e e
i i j k
j N k N
B e D e i N
∈ ∈
 
= ∀ ∈  
  ∑ ∑   (16)   20 
Having defined the ideal reference level of emissions, we can now write the identity 
function in the following way, where 
*
i e  is considered exogenous: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
2 * * , i i i i i I e e E e γ ρ   = − −   ω   (17) 
Using this function in the maximisation problem defined by (7), we can show that 
every country will emit more than the “ideal” emissions level. 
LEMMA 2 
Even if countries care about their ideal emissions, every individual country will emit 
more than its ideal:  ≥
*
i i E e  and, therefore, total amount of permits allocated will 
exceed the socially optimal level: ω ≥
*
N N e . 
Proof: Assume, on the contrary, that  ∃ ∈ <
*
i i i N : E e . From the strict concavity of 
the emissions benefit function, it follows that  ( ) ( ) >
e e *
i i i i B E B e . Using the (2) and 
(17) implies: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * ρ ω ρ ω
∈
= > = = ⇒ < ∑
e e e
N i i i i j N N N N
j N
B E B e D e e e    
At the same time, we can derive: 
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This contradicts the previously established inequality. Thus, for ∀ ∈ ≥
*
i i i N : E e . 
Given that every country emits more than the ideal level, the total emissions in the 
endogenous permit allocation equilibrium will exceed the first-best level: 
* ω > N N e . 
Q.E.D. 
As every country always emits more than its ideal, we can easily sign the derivative of 




i i i i I E e E
ω γρ   ∆ = − − <     (18) 
Based  on  this,  we  find  that  when  all  countries  care  about  their  ideal  effort,  the 
endogenous permit allocation equilibrium shifts towards the Pareto efficient first-best 
allocation of emissions, and they will emit less than without moral concerns.  
PROPOSITION 3 
If  countries  care  about  their  ideal  effort,  every  individual  country  will  emit  less 
without moral concerns and global emissions will be lower. 
Proof: Assume, in contrast, that 
I o
N N ω ω > . Using convexity of the damage functions, 
it follows that:  ( ) ( )
e I e o
j N j N
j N j N
D D ω ω
∈ ∈
> ∑ ∑ . As before, using the appropriate first-order 













   
Hence,  the  equilibrium  permit  price  would  be  higher  with  moral  concerns  than 
without. As the equilibrium price is decreasing in the global permit allocation, we find 
that 
I o
N N ω ω <  which contradicts the initial assumption. Therefore, we get ω ω ≤
I o
N N . 
Also, as the equilibrium price of permits will be higher with moral concerns, every 
country’s  representative  firm  will  emit  less: 
( ) ( )
e I I o e o I o
i i i i i i B E B E E E ρ ρ = > = ⇒ <  due to concavity of the benefit functions. 
Q.E.D. 
This result is in contrast to the previous conclusion when countries cared about their 
level of emissions trading and moral concerns could lead to higher global emissions. 
The reason is that, when countries care about their ideal level of emissions, they feel a 
warm glow when doing more than what a strictly private cost benefit analysis would 
prescribe. This shows that it matters what people’s concerns are about. If the main 
concern is distaste against trading emission permits, the environment may be harmed, 
while if the desire is to reduce emissions at home, the environment will benefit. Note, 
that this latter conclusion we have assumed that all countries share the same moral 
standpoint. This will not necessary be the case, and we will comment on that at the 
end.   22 
4.5 Combining both identity effects 
One may argue that people’s moral concerns follow both from distaste against trading 
permits as well as the desire to reduce emissions at home. Thus, it seems appropriate 
to combine the identity functions from the previous sections. Taken together, the full 
identity function can be written as: 
  ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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ω ω ω
ω
  (19) 
The new identity function describes an internal conflict; we can have 
*
i i e e = , but still 
i i e ω ≠ , thus doing what is best according to one moral ideal may not fulfill the other. 
We can now characterize the full impacts of the moral concerns.  
PROPOSITION 4 
If countries are reluctant to trade permits and if they care about abatement at home, 







  − >   ∑ , or 
•  the concerns about abatement at home are strong enough to compensate the 
reluctance to trade. 
Proof: The proof is trivial by combining PROPOSITION 2 and PROPOSITION 3. 
At first sight, one might think it is obvious that moral concerns would lead to lower 
global emissions. However, PROPOSITION 4 shows that this depends crucially on 
both  the  form  of  the  identity  function  and  the  balance  of  power  between  permit 
importers and exporters. 






  −   ∑  is 
likely  to  be  negative. We  can,  therefore,  conclude  that  the  overall emission  level 
resulting from the international climate negotiations outcome will be lower if there is 
a relatively strong concern about actual emission levels in all countries. If this concern 
is  weak,  or  if few countries  share  this concern,  and  in  addition  there  is  a  strong 
distaste against permit trading, emissions may actually be higher than without any   23 
concerns about permit trading. Thus, aiming for the good does not always bring the 
desired outcomes. 
5.  Restrictions on permit trading 
As mentioned in the introduction, restrictions of permit trading as found in the Kyoto 
Protocol  and  in  the  ETS,  may  have  been  introduced  due  to  reluctance  of  trading 
permits. From economic theory we know that restrictions on free permit trading may 
increase the costs of a treaty; the cost-effective volume may not be within reach. 
When the costs are higher, the incentives to join the treaty for individual countries 
will be lower. As a result, the treaty may fail or it may consist of fewer countries. The 
consequence  may  be  higher  global  emissions.  However,  this  result  follows  from 
standard economic reasoning where the permit allocation is assumed exogenous to 
each country,  and  where countries  are assumed  to  have  no  moral  concerns  about 
permit trading. If these assumptions do not hold, will the standard result still prevail? 
Over allocation of permits was the reason for higher emissions under moral concerns 
about permit trading. Thus, we focus on the case with symmetric identity function and 
where buyers are restricted from buying permits, i.e., 
     [ ] ( ) − − < − i i i i e a e ω ω .  (20) 
This means that the amount of permit a country can buy should be less than a certain 
share, a, of the  necessary abatement. Assume now that this restriction is binding, i.e., 
countries would like to buy a larger share. In this case we find: 
PROPOSITION 5 
If countries are reluctant to trade permits, identity is symmetric, and the restriction on 
buying permits is binding, global emissions will be lower than in the case without 
such restrictions. 
Proof: The proof follows the same line as the proof of Lemma 1. As the first order 
condition from (11) gives 
[ ] 2 1     − = − − + −    
+
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
e e p
i i i i i B D E E
ω ω ω ρ δ ρ ,   24 
we see that an effective restriction on buying permits makes the term on the right side 
less negative. Thus, the marginal benefit will be closer to the marginal damage and 
there will be less of an over allocation. 
Q.E.D. 
As there is a restriction on trade, the permit importing countries are less tempted to 
over allocate emissions compared to the situation without the restrictions on trade. 
This has a positive effect on the environment. The reduced incentive to over allocate 
also applies to the strategic trade motive. Thus, the restriction reduces emissions also 
in  absence  of  moral  concerns  as  long  as  the  emissions  allowances  are  set 
endogenously. Note, however, that while emissions go down, welfare will also go 
down, otherwise the restrictions would not have been binding.  
Finally, in the case with moral preferences for abating at home, a restriction on permit 
trading  will  also  has  a  positive  effect  on  emissions  because,  also  in  this  case,  it 
reduces the strategic trade motive in permit importing countries. 
6.  Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper we have analysed how moral concerns about permit trading affect an 
endogenous pollution permit trading equilibrium, in which governments choose non-
cooperatively  their  national  permit  allocations,  and  therefore  also  the  overall 
environmental  objective.  There  may  be  different  reasons  why  people  and  their 
governments have moral concerns about permit trading.  For instance, countries may 
be reluctant to trade permits because they think it is a way to escape their moral 
responsibility, or because of the assumed negative consequences the trade may have 
in  developing  countries.  Hence,  both  consequentialist  and  procedural  ethics 
arguments are used to justify limits on access to flexible mechanisms like CDM in the 
framework of the Kyoto Protocol or the European Emission Trading Scheme. 
Given  an  internationally  negotiated  permit  trading  system,  we  find  that  moral 
concerns  may  increase  or  reduce  global  emissions  depending  on  the  precise 
formulation  of  these  concerns.  We  considered  two  ways  to  specify  the  moral 
considerations. The first captures the idea that countries might be reluctant to trade. 
They may have some distaste about trading and would like to avoid it; they consider 
trading pollution permits not a good thing in itself. If this view is held by permit   25 
importers only, global emissions will be higher than in an equilibrium without moral 
concerns. The reason is that permit importers over allocate their domestic firms in 
order to reduce the amount of permits they have to import. However, if the view is 
held by both permit sellers and buyers, this result is not necessary true as permit 
exporters would like to reduce their export. The overall effect on global emissions 
will  depend  on  the  balance  of  power  (more  precisely  the  slope  of  the  marginal 
abatement cost functions in equilibrium) between permit importers and exporters. But 
under  reasonable  assumption,  we  conjecture  that  global  emissions  are  likely  to 
increase also in this case.  
The second formulation of moral concerns takes into account that countries would 
like to avoid permit trading as they feel it is their obligation to reduce emissions at 
home.  They  take  into  account  what  they  ideally  should  do,  and  would  strive  to 
implement  the  corresponding  ideal  effort  level  that  requires  substantial  emission 
reductions. We show that global emissions will always be lower with this type of 
moral considerations if all countries follow this rule, as they all have an additional 
incentive to reduce emissions. However, note that this conclusion dependents on all 
countries  having  similar  moral  concerns.  If  this  is  not  the  case,  and  only  a  few 
countries  have  this  view,  the  additional  abatement  would  share  similarities  to 
unilateral actions taken by one single country. The literature on unilateral actions, 
such as Hoel (1991), concludes that this policy may affect the outcome of negotiations 
on emission reductions, and it may very well imply higher total emissions due to 
carbon leakages. However, if the unilateral action is announced as a commitment to 
reduce emissions in excess of the outcome of the negotiation, total emissions will 
likely  be  lower  compared  to  the  case  where  all  countries  act  selfishly.  Hoel  and 
Golombek  (2004)  also  argue  that  with  endogenous  technologies  and  technology 
diffusion between countries, it is no longer obvious that reduced emissions in some 
countries will increase emissions in other countries. Thus, the global emission impact 
from the concern about abatement at home is not clear. However, this shows that 
moral concerns about permit trading based on the desire to reduce national emissions 
to what is deemed morally right, does not necessary have a significant impact on 
global emissions if the concern is shared among a few countries only. 
Another interesting result from this study relates to restrictions on permit trading as 
has been introduced in the Kyoto Protocol and the ETS. While standard economic   26 
theory suggests that such restrictions may be bad for the environment as they increase 
the costs of reaching an emission target, and, therefore, the incentive to join a treaty, 
we  show  that  such  restrictions  may  actually  reduce  global  emissions  when 
governments  have  moral  concerns  about  trading  permits.  The  reason  is  that  the 
incentive of permit importers to over allocate domestic industries to reduce permit 
purchase will be reduced. If restrictions have been introduced due to moral concerns, 
global emissions will actually be lower, a counterintuitive result compared to standard 
economic theory. Note that these restrictions will also reduce over allocation due to 
the strategic permit trading effect. Thus, permit  trade restrictions  may  actually be 
good for the environment. 
Different formulations of the moral concerns than the ones  we considered in this 
paper are  of  course  possible.  However,  we  think  that  we  covered two  interesting 
cases, one that had a negative effect on the environment and one that had a positive 
effect.  But  as  argued,  also  in  the  latter  case  there  may  be  reasons  why  global 
emissions may increase. Therefore, we think this is a rather strong result, even if it is 
counterintuitive. 
There are several ways to follow up this study. A tempting task is to relate the first 
practical experiences with international emission allocations by governments, such as 
ETS and the Kyoto agreement, to our theoretical results. In particular, it would be 
interesting to disentangle moral motivations for imposing limits on access to permit 
trading  from  strategic  price  manipulation  motives.  Our  theoretical  results  might 
provide a  reference framework  to do empirical tests comparing actual negotiation 
outcomes  with  results  from  simulations  models  of  permit  trading  markets  for 
distinguishing between the different motivations. 
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Appendix: The benefit function 
A general abatement cost function frequently used in the literature is: 
  ( ) C a    
Abatement, a, is defined as the difference between the business-as-usual emissions e  
and actual emissions  e, i.e.,  a e e = − . Where business as usual (BAU) emissions 
are defined as emissions in absence of environmental regulations.  
It is usually assumed that this cost function has the following properties (see, e.g., 
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Abatement costs are defined as the difference in benefits between the business-as-
usual and actual emission level 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) C a C e e B e B e = − = −    
which defines a benefit function: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) B e B e C a = −    
We assume that benefits of emissions are such that an interior solution to the firm’s 
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